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SYSTEMS THEORY
by
Robert D. Leighninger, Jr.
SUNY-Oswego
Recently I found in my mailbox an announcement that recent ad-
vancements in "Human Behavior Science" could now make me a "Winner"
in my varied relationships with others. Self-understanding, happiness,
and personal success could now be gained through a new perspective on
life. The brochure explained:
About 2 years ago, a new theory exploded in the world of
Human Behavior research. It is called General Systems
Theory-and it is a totally new way of looking at humans
and their environments. The idea is that each of us lives
at the heart of a dynamic system. Everything you do (your
input) produces a reaction from others (feedback). As a
result, each one of us can change the entire system just
by changing our input. (emphasis original)
It would cost $126 for twelve tape cassettes to show me how to put
this new research to use and become a winner.
Scholars and practitioners who are doing anything at all useful
relative to social problems as they are popularly perceived will be
familiar with the periodic appearance of the hucksters, using their
ideas as bait for a quick profit. In fact, the arrival of the profi-
teers may be looked upon by some as a form of flattery and a reassur-
ance that we are doing something useful. Others may see it as the
price that must be paid for innovation. "If you can't stand the hoak-
am," Bertram Gross once paraphrased, "get out of the kitchen. That's
where new ideas are cooked up." (1968) Still, to extend the metaphor
a bit, test kitchens usually use better ingredients than do mass pro-
duction lines. Finding the all-beef patty under the ketchup, onions,
pickles, and oversized bun is not always easy. What's cooked up may
be convenient, but it is not always nourishing.
Systems Theory has generated a lot of excitement in the last
decade. It has also spawned more than its share of pitchmen, enough
so that it is in danger of being discredited before its genuine po-
tential in many fields of practice has been fairly tested. Wearing
the double halo of Science and Corporate Efficiency conferred by its
association with the aerospace industry and the Pentagon, it has been
enthusiastically offered to Federal and State governments (Chartrand,
1971; Hoos, 1969 & 1972) as well as private individuals and organiza-
tions as a way of solving complex social problems like mass transit,
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crime, and welfare dependency. As with any situation where expecta-
tions are raised (at high cost in contract fees) and tnen left unful-
filled, the reaction may indict basic ideas and intemperate applica-
tions alike.
Let us, then, look more closely at the history and logic of sys-
tems theory and try to assess its strengths and weaknesses as a guide
to social work practice. Remembering Gross' admonition, we must be
tolerant of the confusion and error that are part of the ferment of
innovative thinking and yet wary of its intoxication. To change the
metaphor from food to drink: Getting too high makes one a dangerous
driver and an easy mark. This is, after all, the practitioner's spe-
cial problem. He or she must deal daily with the lives of real people,
not imaginative constructs. After a yeasty session with intoxicating
ideas, theorists can always sit in the back seat and sing; but the
practitioner is the one who has to get behind the wheel and drive safe-
ly home.
A BRIEF HISTORY
Systems theory as we know it is a product of the late 1940's, but
its intellectual background goes deep into the nineteenth century.
This history is worth knowing about because it provides insight into
some of the perils of systems thinking.
Systems theory's inspiration in both classic and modern periods
is strongly biological. The comparison of society to a biological or-
ganism spawned several generations of sociological theory and laid the
groundwork for the systems idea. The first generation was led by the
English sociologist Herbert Spencer. It became known, after the 1859
publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species, as "Social Dar-
winism." (This label itself is a good example of intellectual oppor-
tunism, because Darwin had little to do with the social applications
of his biological ideas.) The purpose of comparing society to a biol-
ogical organism was to emphasize the complexity, interdependence, and
evolutionary adaptability of a society. For Spencer, this led to the
conclusion that the only kind of social change possible was ti~at which
took place at the glacial pace of biological evoluation. Planned in-
tervention in social problems by legislators and other do-gooders was
both unnecessary and doomed to failure by the unanticipated consequen-
ces of disturbing "natural" processes.
More recent organismic sociology has repudiated the crudeness
of Social Darwinist politics, but its tendency to respect the status
quo and distrust change has persisted. Many find a definite connec-
tion between the organismic analogy and these political conclusions.
Thus, the relative simplicity of this earlier formulation is an aid to
understanding the logic of organismic thinking. Of particular inter-
est is the argument between conservative and liberal wings of American
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Social Darwinism, represented by William Graham Sumner and Lester Ward
respectively, over the differences between biological and social or-
ganization. (See, e.g., Hofstadter, 1955) Ward argued that human
intelligence allowed intervention to improve on the wastefulness of
nature. Social organization was the result of "synergy," the combina-
tion of "genetic" (biological) and "telic" (human choice) forces. This
argument previews a current argument in systems theory. (Buckley, 1967,
13)
The second intellectual generation in organismic thinking is
dominated by Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist of the 1890's. Durk-
heim downplayed the evolutionism of the Social Darwinists and did not
despair of constructive intervention in complex socieities. He was,
however, supremely concerned with order and structure. He was convinced
of the dependence of people on an organized society cemented by agreed-
upon norms and values.
The amazing "Generation of the 90's" (Hughes, 1961) contained
many who contributed to contemporary sociological theory, but it was
Durkheim who had the most impact on American mainstream sociology of
the mid-twentieth century. This became the third generation of organ-
ismic sociology and is generally known as Structural-Functionalism.
Though functionalist sociology is discussed elsewhere in this volume,
its major features must be recalled here because they are part of the
context of systems theory in social work. One of the influential books
in the development of both systems theory and functionalist sociology
was W.B. Cannon's The Wisdom of the Body (1932). The concept of homeo-
stasis, coined by Cannon, is one of the key difficulties in the appli-
cation of systems theory.
Homeostasis is the tendency of a biological organism to seek and
keep some kind of operating balance in its internal processes, or, at
least, to keep processes within certain limits. This concept, when
added to the Durkheimian concentration on a social order based on an
integration of structured norms and values, leads with unfortunate ease
to the conclusion that internal social change is largely self-regula-
tory. Thus, we come back to the general area of Spencer's "hands-off"
attitude. It also leads to an identification of disorder with disease,
something Durkheim encouraged by his references to social "pathology."
If social change takes care of itself in the "body politic," then
groups advocating conscious planned intervention in social processes
or planned restructuring of society will be viewed with suspicion. In-
deed, radicals may be seen as a social disease. They may even appear
to be diseased themselves and in need of therapy to restore their men-
tal, and our social, health. If social workers take this viewpoint,
they may find themselves taking very repressive roles in society.
Functionalist sociologists and their critics have argued about
these issues for some time. (see particularly Demerath and Peterson,
1967; Reynolds and Reynolds, 1970) It is just one example of the
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practical implications of models. More will be said as we discuss the
details of systems thinking. It is important, however, to know at the
outset that systems theorists do not face the dilemmas of homeostasis
all by themselves. They've had a lot of company and can perhaps learn
from others' struggles. Failure to appreciate the long history of the
organismic analogy results, I think, in an underestimation of its dif-
ficulties in practice.
Organismic sociology 4s one of the contributors to modern systems
theory. Information theory and cybernetics are the others. Informa-
tion theory is a mathematical development which arose from the need to
measure the capacity of electronic communications equipment. The need
to measure, in turn, seems to have come from the desire, in the post-
war period, to sell this equipment to buyers concerned with relative
capacity to broadcast. This hardware concern was met by the applica-
tion and development of a kind of probability theory first used in
thermodynamics to describe the movements of gases. (This is where the
concept of "entropy" first enters. About this, more later.) Informa-
tion theory did not stay confined to the world of mathematicians or
electronics engineers. The possibility of its application to biology
was immediately grasped. W. Ross Ashby's Design for a Brain (1952) was
the culmination of several years of considering the human organism as
an information processing machine. Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics (1948)
is a related effort, popularized later in The Human Use of Human Beings
(1950).
The possibility of a new, comparative understanding of humans
and the most sophisticated of machines through the mathematics of in-
formation probabilities brought systems theory into being. Ludwig Von
Bertalanffy was one of those most impressed by the potential of the
systems concept for bridging the distance between social, organic, and
mechanical knowledge. He coined the term General System Theory in 1937
while part of a philosophy seminar with Charles Morris at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, though he didn't publish the idea until after the War.
Organization, he felt, was the key to understanding the world. The
various components of the universe, be they atoms, people, or societies,
were less important than the way they were put together. Thus, an
organism might be just one example of an "organized system." (Rapoport
in Buckley, 1968,xx) A society might be categorized as a kind of "com
plex adaptive system." (Buckley, 1967, 5) The real excitement of sys-
1. In classic Information Theory, "information" refers only to the
capacity to send messages. Received and stored information is not in-
cluded in "information." Hence, Communication Theory has arisen as a
broader, less strictly mathematical, field of study. You can get into
trouble, in some circles, by using "information" and "communication"
interchangeably.
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2
tems theory, particularly the idea of General System Theory, was that
it was not just another variety of organismic sociology, but that it
promised to be a basis of unification of all the sciences. Moreover,
the basis of this unity was not just another metaphorical comparison,
but one where structural isomorphism (sameness of shape) might be es-
tablished and where mathematical precision could be employed to nail
it all down. This is indeed an intoxicating idea. Imaginative social
work scholar/practitioners were understandably drawn to it along with
others from many fields. But what, specifically, has the systems no-
tion to offer social workers beyond the promise of eventual unification
of the physical and social sciences at the most abstract of levels?
Can it provide any concrete guidance to the complex reality that social
workers experience daily?
THE USES OF THEORY
It might be worthwhile to ask at this point: What can a social
worker reasonably expect from a theory? Theories are more or less sys-
tematic assemblages of terms or concepts and relationships that offer
explanations. They are frames of reference, organized or unorganized,
that we refer to for guidance, consciously or unconsciously, in devel-
oping some trans-situational basis for action. They involve generaliza-
tions that go beyond individual situations and yet are not so general
as to be untestable. An example of the latter problem are horoscopes
whose predictions are vague enough to fit almost any event that does
occur. Sociological theories, because they are concerned with the more
abstract and general levels of social organization, often have this
problem. General Systems Theory, we have seen, is particularly abstract
because it seeks the organizational similarities of such a vast range
of being: physical, organic, and socio-cultural.
Even at the higher levels of abstraction, theories are useful to
practice in that they help organize and sort out from the many possible
things going on in the world those things most likely to be important
in a particular situation. They sensitize one to look for things that
might not otherwise be noticed. They suggest what should be focused
on and what is peripheral. Hopefully, this selective, hierarchical,
explanation will get down to the level of individual situations so that
some guidance to action is possible. Also, this guidance ought to be
so phrased that one can judge after the event if it worked or failed.
Sociological theories are often frustrating to social workers because
they provide too little specific guidance to action. Freudian psychol-
ogy, on the other hand, has a good deal to say about practice. Its
problems relate to its prescriptions being constructed so that they
2. Though Bertalanffy reserved the singular form for his General theory,
this usage has not been widely adopted. Systems theory will be the
phrase used here.
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can't be judged right or wrong. Any event or outcome can fit into the
diagnosis. Rosenhan (1973), Goffman (1961) and others have shown, for
example, how easy it is to interpret current and past behavior of an
ordinary life into a pathological pattern. The practitioner, then, has
the vexing problem of deciding what is true and what will work. Doing
controlled research is not usually within his or her range of options.
And, for a variety of reasons we have no space to discuss, he or she
cannot often use the research of others to provide a guarantee of suc-
cessful action. The best one can do is know something about how to
ask the right questions (theory) and how to recognize good answers
when they appear (methodology).
It is my contention that systems theory, like most macro-level
theories, is not likely (at least at the moment) to provide concrete,
proven guidance to practice. It is, and will probably continue to be,
used as a frame of reference for practice, organizing within its broad
scope a variety of micro-practical theories and techniques. (see,
e.g. Anderson & Carter, 1974) Let us proceed to look at the kinds of
questions systems theory encourages us to ask, the ones it doesn't ask,
and the general direction it takes us. In the process, it will, I hope,
become apparent why systems theory in practice has been such a mixed
blessing and is so easily exploited by the profiteers.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SYSTEMS
The usual definitions of a system are simple and general: "a to-
tality of elements in interaction," or "the dynamic interrelatedness
of components," (Buckley, 1968, xxiii-xxv) or "a whole which functions
as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts." (Hapoport
in Buckley, 1968, xiv) Two salient characteristics of systems theory
are prominent in these definitions: a concern for wholes and for in-
terrelatedness. From the first concern derives the problem of estab-
lishing boundaries: what is part of the system and what is not? What
is outside the boundary of the system in question is labeled "environ-
ment." Allied to the second concern, interrelatedness, is the problem
of "homeostasis." It is often assumed, particularly by social work
systems theorists, that the major process characterizing the relation-
ship of components of a system is the homeostatic tendency, mentioned
earlier, of seeking balance or at least smoothness of operation. These
are all, as we have seen, legacies of organismic sociology. The advent
of cybernetics brought the idea that the key to interrelationships and
their balancing tendencies was information. Thus, analysis of "mes-
sages" and "feedback" revealed important tnings about organization of
both living and non-living systems. The basic concept of system, then,
directs our attention to problems of wholes and their parts, their
boundaries, their major processes (chiefly, homeostasis), and the in-
formation exchanges that drive these processes.
To this list must be added two other concepts from the Post-War
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interplay of biology and information theory. "Entropy" is the assumed
universal tendency of systems toward disorganization, randomness, and
chaos. "Equifinality" is the assumption that there is always more than
one way to arrive at a given end. These are the concepts we must now
examine.
Before we proceed, however, we must note a preliminary problem
of theory-building that systems theory makes especially important.
Though analogies, models, and metaphors are ubiquitous in theory-buil-
ding, systems theory makes analogizing a major indoor sport. This is
both legitimate and dangerous. Walter Buckley points to the shift in
biological theory from concern with substance to concern with organiza-
tion as a major inspiration of systems theory. This means that out-
wardly dissimilar things can yet embody similarities in operation.
"The major goal of the General Systems Research movement is to trace
out.. .structural similarities, and structural differences, between
'substantively' different systems." (1967, 3, emphasis original) Sim-
ilarities are not to be taken for granted. They are to be tested, not
assumed. Ida Hoos' indignant comment on attempts in California to use
aerospace systems analysts to tackle social problems is worth mention
here:
In the real world, there appears to be about as much jus-
tification for committing society's sundry malfunctioning
systems to the care of a systems analyst whose sole claim
to expertise is technical as to call a hydraulic engineer
to cure an ailing heart because his speciality is pumping
systems. Although the term 'system' can be applied to
both space hardware and social problems, the inputs are
vastly different, as are the controls and objectives.
(1969, 23-24)
The interesting potential in the discovery of structural similarities
between systems of different orders remains in the realm of poetic
metaphor until the practical limitations of those similarities are
carefully spelled out.
WHOLES AND HOLISM
The encouragement to look at things as wholes is one of the most
widely appealing aspects of systems theory to social workers and other
practitioners. The tendency of social work to concentrate on one-to-
one interventions using psychological theories has diminished in recent
years and a counter tendency which tries to consider the influences of
larger social structural forces is gathering support. Systems theory
offers the promise of eventually being able to relate micro-social
problems to macro-social forces.
When advocates present the merits of a systems approach, they
often cite examples where important things were left out, thus rendering
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the result laughable or disastrous or both. (Halpert, 1968) No one
wants to be accused of ignoring some important factor. Moreover, as
said earlier, it is good that social workers are wrestling more openly
with problems of large-scale organization. Nonetheless, beyond initial
sensitization to the "big picture," one must ask whether a systems
approach can help us include all the right elements. Obviously, not
everything is relevant. Nor are all relevant factors of equal impor-
tance. To get an idea of what kind of factors a systems analysis is
likely to regard as important, we will have to look further.
It is worth noting that, in practice, systems analysts seem to
have as much trouble as anyone else in including all the significant
facotrs. Robert Boguslaw, whose experience among systems theorists
leads him to compare them with the nineteenth century utopians, says:
The history of utopian design efforts seem to reveal a
high correlation between the use of rigorous rationality
within a system design and the omission of significant
elements from the system model. (1965, 64)
An example of this myopia is the creation of a criminal justice evalua-
tion system proposed for the State of California by an aerospace firm.
It was based on conviction statistics, ignoring all current reserva-
tions about such statistics as an index of crime, much less a defini-
tion of it. (Hoos, 1970, 209-213)
Another worm in the apple of wholism is the peril of going to
the opposite extreme and trying to regiment everything into an over-
arching plan whether it fits or not. City planners have been accused
of this vice. (See, particularly, Semnett's provocative argument, 1970,
87-95.) Even systems theorist C. West Churchman laments that "...large
systems are unaesthetic; they are neither beautiful nor interestingly
ugly. They are boring, plain, uncreative, abominable, smelly, gray,
tasteless." (1968, 198) Thus, we have problems both with leaving too
much out and putting too much in, and practitioners of systems analysis
don't seem to have any special claim to solving them yet.
BOUNDARIES
The definition of a system requires knowing what's in and what's
out. Part of what's outside the boundary of a system (its environment)
may be another system. Therefore, careful definition must proceed any
systems analysis. The fact that systems theory forces the social
worker to make such an analysis is a positive contribution. It forces
not only some awareness of "the big picture" but also some self examina-
tion. Am I part of the impinging environment forcing the client(s)
to adapt or am I part of an effort, in concert with the client(s), to
alter the impinging environment?
The difficulty with the definition of system boundaries is that
they are probably always very arbitrary. Where is the "edge" of a
nuclear family, dividing it from an extended family, friendships, work
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requirements, community ties, political demands, etc.? But sensitivity
to this problem is an advantage. If one is wary of the definition of
boundaries, one may avoid the related problem of assuming too quickly
that various systems are self-contained or self-regulating, or that they
should be.
INTEGRATION
One of the greatest problems of systems theory, as amply demon-
strated by its ancestry in organismic sociology, is the tendency to
assume that parts of something defined as a system are related to each
other without some attempt to see that they are. It is one thing to
be on the alert for subtle interconnections and unanticipated conse-
quences. It is quite another to assume, as did the conservative Social
Darwinists, that things were so completely and bafflingly intertwined
that society should be left completely free of planned direction or
change. In taking social work out of the temptation to assume that
most problems are individual/psychological ones, will systems theory
produce a crop of neo-Spencerians who, while recognizing the social
nature of many problems, find them so complex that they despair of
solving them and go back to individual therapy as the only profitable
use of their talents?
A related problem with a similar conservative outcome stems from
the exaggeration of the importance of the varied parts of a system
for its survival. If everything in a society is "functional," that is,
supports the operation of the system in some way, then to change or
eliminate any part may threaten the survival of the system. This leads
easily to a conviction that everything that exists in a given social
order is necessary and ought to be defended against attack. Thus may
an overestimation of integration result in an automatic defense of the
status quo. (for a presentation of this problem by the most articulate
defender of functionalist sociology see Merton, 1968, ch. I)
A more likely risk is the possibility of overstating not how
much things are interrelated but how much they should be interrelated.
This is perhaps another way of discussing the problem of rigidified
holism. Alfred Kahn says quite bluntly: "Proponents of decentraliza-
tion, community control, and participatory administration could find
their activities in conflict with a systems emphasis." (1973, 146)
Is integration an unqualified good and is it the task of social work
to increase it? Can all parts of a system be successfully integrated?
If not, must we alter the very definition of "system?" In a hetero-
geneous society, how much integration is necessary to survival or to
the maximum satisfaction of its citizens? Are there situations where
too much integration could pose a threat to either of these goals?
Alvin Gouldner has suggested that the latter situation is quite
possible and that "de-differentiation" and "functional autonomy,"
the factors Kahn seems to believe are warned against by systems theory,
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might not only be helpful to the operation of a society but may become
the only way of saving a system in a threatening environment. Noting
such examples as the work of Goffman on the tendency of people to re-
sist total integration (1961), Gouldner suggests that the organization
of a social system may be shaped as much by the conflicts and tensions
between parts as by their harmonious interaction. (in Demerath & Peter-
son, 1967, 160) He goes on to describe situations where parts are not
only not fully integrated but where actual reduction in integration
may be required for system survival. A looser, simpler re-grouping may
be necessary to adapt. Community control of social services, Federal
revenue sharing, ethnic pride, job enlargement and worker control on
the assembly line may decrease integration and heighten disorder but
benefit society in the long run. "In short, limited increases in ran-
domness, by way of structural de-differentiation, may be the ultimate
defense of systems in the face of extremity." (Gouldner in Demerath &
Peterson, 1967, 166) Richard 3ennett's The Uses of Disorder offers a
similar argument, on both personality and community levels, for the
importance of de-regulation and an increase of uncertainty, variety,
and conflict for the nurturance of personality and communal growth.
(1970) (For a related concern, see section on VARIETY below.)
HOMEOSTASIS AND MORPHOGENESIS
Another hotly contested issue in the history of organismic sociol-
ogy is the concept of homeostasis. As noted earlier, the assumption
of a balance-seeking tendency in societies analogous to the self-regu-
lating properties of biological organisms has led to conservative
political conclusions that parallel those stemming from an overestima-
tion of the importance of integration. With a few notable exceptions
(Lathrop in Hearn, 1969, 51; Stein, 1974, 38. Stein disagrees with my
assessment of social work consensus.), most social work systems theo-
rists assume the central importance of homeostasis. (Janchill, 1969;
Kramer & Specht, 1969 27; Meyer in Kahn, 1973; Shafer in Hearn, 1969,
32; Nelsen, 1972, 6315 It is also widely used apart from the rest of
the systems concepts in such contexts as psychoanalysis, family therapy,
and crisis intervention. (e.g. Wood in Strean, 1971, 50; Scherz in
Roberts and Nee, 1970, 229; Rapoport in Roberts and Nee, 1970, 276)
Walter Buckley, however, goes to great lengths to show that the concept
of homeostasis must be transcended if systems theory is to be useful
in understanding social life (1967). It is ironic that, while this
book is often cited in the social work literature, Buckley's argument
seems to have had so little influence.
Buckley observes that, "...whereas mature organisms, by the very
nature of their organization, cannot cnange their given structure be-
yond very narrow limits and still remain viable, this capacity is pre-
cisely what distinguishes sociocultural systems." (1967,14) The pro-
cess of elaborating or changing structure he calls "morphogenesis."
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(1967, 58)
Those social workers who have accepted homeostasis as an essen-
tial and useful part of systems theory may be aware of the intellectual
difficulties this raises and the political conclusions it invites.
Some seek to mitigate the problem by the use of a term like "dynamic
equilibrium." Others reject equilibrium and homeostasis entirely in
favor of the term "steady state." Anderson and Carter, who seem fully
aware of the difficulties of homeostasis, define steady state merely
as the tendency of a form of organization to persist over time. They
stress morphogenesis and even argue, following Buckley (1967, 160),
that tension is normal, not pathological; that it is not reduced auto-
matically; and that it may even be produced by a properly functioning
system (1974, 18-20). Nevertheless, the term "steady state" remains
vulnerable to the same static associations and, hence, debilities as
the earlier terms. Its very origins tie it to Cannon's homeostasis
(1939, 24).
The reason why social workers should be wary of equilibrium,
homeostatic, and steady state metaphors are simply stated, yet they may
remain for many unconvincing. To be aware of the status-quo orienta-
tion of such conepts is often considered enough to innoculate users
against unwitting conservatism. Yet the history of organismic sociol-
ogy suggests this is not enough. Many have read Merton's eloquent
argument that functionalism is compatible even with a Marxist view of
social change. This includes, among other things, an indictment of
Cannon's attempt to apply homeostasis to societies. (in Demerath &
Peterson, 1967, 40) Yet these arguments have not saved functionalist
sociology from regular use as an instrument of the status quo. (In
addition to Demerath and Peterson, 1967, see also Reynolds and Reynolds,
1970, on this issue). It may well be that in cases like this, theore-
tical models of whatever construction and logic yield to larger poli-
tical forces. Yet I suspect that there may be powers of association
and subtle persuasion in our theoretical constructs that themselves
compel us to move in certain directions and that this can affect the
wary as well as the unwary. Some concepts it is better to throw out
than try to repair.
SURVIVAL
Survival is the prime value in biological organisms. Integration
and homeostasis are usually justified in terms of their contribution
to survival. Indeed, those who oppose homeostasis and argue for the
utility of less integration, often do so on survival grounds. Gould-
ner and Buckley, for example, defend autonomy, morphogenesis, or de-
differentiation by pointing out their greater adaptability. It is
worth considering at this point, if only for a minute, whether this
part of the orgnaismic analogy is appropriate at the level of social
organization. Should survival be the supreme value here? Should all
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organiuations and associations be maintained, and is it the social
worker's duty to work for their preservation? Is it possible that
some might outlive their usefulness or that others should never have
been born?
We should all be familiar with the tendency of organizations to
perpetuate themselves even to the detriment of the purposes for which
they were organized. Charity drives frequently spend more on the costs
of organization than on the charity itself. Perhaps it is too much to
expect the Cancer Society to resist metamorphosis into the Ingrown
Toenail Foundation once a cure for cancer is found. Nor is it likely
that heads of Federal agencies will be seen trooping into the Presi-
dent's office asking to be disbanded. Nonetheless, a theoretical
orientation that places too high a value on organizational survival
might be a dis-service to those concerned with the social welfare of
society.
ENTROPY
The introduction of the concept of entropy into social work seems
to me a good example of accepting an analogy without checking on its
empirical plausibility (is it really present in social systems?) or
its metaphoric utility (what does it inspire us to think about?). En-
tropy is a concept drawn from classic thermodynamics and has most
relevance to the distribution of particles in gases. The notion enters
systems theory for two reasons. First, entropy was linked to informa-
tion by the physicist Leo Szilard, defining both in terms of probabilit
This mathematical formulation of entropy was the basis of the work of
Claude Shannon of the Bell TelephoneLaboratories and others in the
creation of modern Information Theory. A second reason for the popu-
larity of entropy in systems theory is, I suspect, that Norbert Wiener
was not only fascinated by its application to information theory but
saw in Schrodinger's argument that life is counter-entropic a metaphor
for the indeterminacy of modern science. His popular book The Human
Use of Human Beings (1954) contains a recurring theme of heroic man-
kind struggling to create knowledge and order against the tide of en-
tropic chaos. Thus, entropy appealed to early systems theorists be-
cause of the neatness with which the unity of the sciences could be
demonstrated if this concept could be applied to physical, biological,
and social realms, and because of the noble role it assigned to hu-
manity. Despite this, I think it is a deadend for social work on both
counts.
Empirically, the counter-entropy assertion is impossible to prove
in biology. Lila Gatlin, a biophysicist at Berkeley's Space Sciences
3. Wiener does warn the reader in his introduction that he hasn't
checked the limitations of this analogy. (1954, 12)
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Laboratory, maintains that taking the measurements necessary to estab-
lish an entropy difference between higher and lower organisms would
probably kill them. "I think," she says, "our classical notions of en-
tropy as they have come to us from presently established 'laws of phys-
ics and chemistry' are totally inadequate in dealing with the living
system. (1972, 22)
On the level of social organization, the concept of entropy is
at best confusing. The things that are metaphorically associated with
entropy-chaos, randomness, decay, disorganization, "running down"-
may often be found in the company of supposed counter-entropic factors.
The mushroom growth of suburban tract developments in the Post-War
period brought a good deal of chaos to governments, school districts,
and social service agencies. Finding in all of this a demonstration
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is a fruitless undertaking.
The definition of entropy and information in terms of mathematical
probability does seem to have empirical use in biology, where Gatlin
applies it to the genetic coding process of DNA, and in information
engineering, as discussed earlier. But this, Colin Cherry reminds us,
is the highly technical realm of "information capacity fwhich may be
defined strictly on a mathematical basis, without any of the vagueness
which arises when human beings or other biological organisms are re-
garded as 'communications systems.'" (1966, 41) The concept of entropy,
she concludes, "...is one of considerable difficulty and of deceptively
apparent simplicity." (216) She even suggests "...that in true communi-
cations problems the concept of entropy need not be evoked at all."
(217)
Even if the empirical utility of entropy in biological and social
systems is quite narrow, it might be justified on metaphoric or sensi-
tizing grounds. William Gordon discusses entropy's utility for social
work in the context of interchanges between systems and their environ-
ments. For "growth and development" to take place, entropy must be
"extracted" and exported to the environment or otherwise redistributed.
Social work, presumably on the side of growth and development, may
then be defined as trying to reduce entropy. (in Hearn, 1969, 11) This
exposition is consistent with classic thermodynamics, but its applica-
tion to society is less than clear. It calls forth visions of people
with wheelbarrows dumping some kind of gooey substance outside the
city limits. Gordon does not offer his own vision, but more serious
examples can be posited. There are individuals and families that main-
tain their internal functioning by causing chaos around them. There
are coporations whose prosperity is built on environmental disruption.
One can think of nations preserving internal order, covering over prob-
lems of poverty and inequality, through hatred of an external enemy.
These are not, however, inevitable, much less attractice, ways of sol-
ving problems. Gordon, I'm sure, would want social workers to carry
out entropy exchange with minimum disruption to the environment. Still,
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to define social work's goal as the redistribution of entropy seems
yet another dubious proposition. It is another step, like homeostasis,
toward the over-valuation of order. It further suggests that all
growth must be purchased at the price of chaos somewhere else.
EQUIFINALITY
Into this list of potentially dangerous analogies I'd like to
interject one that seems quite benign. "Equifinality" is the postulate
that "the same state may be reached from different initial conditions
and in different ways." (Lathrop quoting Bertalanffy in Hearn, 1969,
59) To put it more humbly: "there's more than one way to skin a cat."
This has a good bit of empirical support and provides social workers
with increased sensitivity to alternatives. It may also provide de-
creased anxiety about diversity. For an occupation frequently hemmed
in by larger and more powerful social structures, this is probably a
good thing.
VARIETY
Related to the concept of equifinality but less widely attended
to by social work theorists is the stress on variety that appears now
and then in systems theory. Both equifinality and variety are derived
from the emphasis on complexity in the organismic analogy. Complex
organisms with a variety of parts seem to be more adaptable to new
situations than simple ones. One group of social workers analyzing
urban organizations from a systems perspective cite Ashby's Law of
Requisite Variety: "...an adaptive system must produce at least as
many effective responses as the number of demands made by the environ-
ment." (Baker, Broskowski, and Brandwein, 1973, 67) Buckley (1967, 90-
92) illustrates the survival value of variety in a culture with exam-
ples from a Baja Indian group. Homogeneity in a community or society
may provide integration and stability, but it may limit the resources
available to meet changing circumstances.
The appreciation of diversity and variety in society is a classic
theme in at least one part of social work tradition. The legacy of
Jane Addams may get new reinforcement if social work systems theorists
choose to develop the side of the organismic analogy that stresses the
value of variety rather than the side which, following Spencer, sees
the organism as too complex to encourage in either the direction of
variety or sameness.
FEEDBACK AND CONTROL
Perhaps the most promising, and also the most difficult, aspect
of systems theory for the social work practitioner is the topic of
"feedback" and its implications for power and social control. Here
the organismic background to systems theory has contributed less than
has information theory. The self-regulating capacity of certain ma-
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chines, from simple thermostats to more complicated self-aiming anti-
aircraft guns, were the inspiration of Wiener's choice of labels for
his own brand of systems theory, "cybernetics," derived from the Greek
word for "steersman." The process by which this self-regulation took
place was called "feedback." Feedback presumes the existence of cer-
tain maintenance criteria, the ability to monitor operation enough to
sense when the criteria aren't being met, and the ability to take some
corrective action.
Like homeostasis, this cybernetic kind of "self-regulation" needs
careful scrutiny. The first complicating factor we find is that there
is feedback and there is "pseudo-feedback." Not every circular rela-
tionship qualifies as feedback. Simple organisms eat and reproduce.
If there is a lot to eat, they reproduce more, which means they eat
more and reproduce more. But they do not cultivate food and do not
regulate their population according to the food supply. If the food
runs out, they die. The difference is that there is no control, no
self-regulation, no corrective action. On the social level, the cycle
of poverty might be an example fo pseudo-feedback. As with the organ-
isms, one condition affects another which returns directly or indirectly
to affect the original. Living in a poor neighborhood means getting
a poor education which means getting a poor job which means having
poor resources which means living in a poor neighborhood which means...
Racial discrimination operates the same way.
Let's take one further example. An actor, through the "feedback"
of his audience and critics, is judged to have given a poor performance.
This may affect his self-confidence which leads to another, even worse,
performance. What seems to distinguish these human "vicious circles"
and "deviance amplifications" from "true feedback" is that the reac-
tions, according to Buckley, are "blind" and not controlled. (1967, 69)
It looks, however, that the difference is that some were helpful and
some weren't. The actor couldn't correct his performance problems,
but he probably thought about them. Those involved in poverty and
discrimination may indeed not know what they are doing, but they may
also not want to do anything differently. Those wno have some control
of the situation may have an interest in not taking corrective action.
This should be kept in mind as we proceed. (see Buckley, 1967, ch. 5)
Even if we use the term "feedback" to cover only those situations
where error can be monitored and the "right" corrective actions taken,
there are still further levels of feedback effectiveness. The thermo-
stat is tne standard example of feedback. It can control the furnace
to maintain a pre-set range of room temperature. What if the depletion
of fuel or its inflated price requires conserving or rationing? We
must redefine "room temperature" by changing the setting on the thermo-
stat. Most error-regulated systems can't do more than maintain a pre-
determined steady state. They can't completely restructure themselves
to meet radical changes in the environment. Even a thermostat that
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would redefine its "comfort zone" according to information from a moni-
tor of fuel reserves could not change over to solar heating.
We must remember, then, that there are different levels of cyber-
netic "self-regulation" and that there are many points where human re-
definition of goals may be crucial. If we wish to apply a cybernetic
model to human society, we must remember that the "self-regulation" is
us mad that reorganization does not take care of itself. It is always
important to know who is doing the defining and redefining of goals and
of success.
INFOHNATION
As we've seen, in the initial formulation of systems theory, one
of the factors comon to machines, organisms, and societies was the use
of Oinformation" as a key to organizational operation and adaptation.
Messages of some sort were transmitted through the feedback process,
connecting the components of the system and guiding it through the
vicissitudes of the environment. This flow of comunication illuminated
the patterns of organization, identifying the centers of control and
their peripheral subordinates. We have also seen how the concept of
information was defined by Information Theory in ways that made its use
in non-mechanical contexts much more difficult. We are accustomed to
use the term in ways closely identified with "meaning" and "knowledge"
rather than as a mathematically defined broadcast potential divorced
from actual human communication. As with much of the original language
of systems theory, the more carefully information was defined, the less
portable it was across the different realms of organization. Nonethe-
less, in its original, broader sense, we may gain at least metaphoric
use in examining social organization in terms of information.
Bystepping Information Theory, at least for the time being, we
are free to ask a number of questions about how communication comes about,
how the meaning of messages comes to be defined, how organization itself
may be defined by who communicates with whom, how hierarchy is estab-
lished by the direction of communication, and how power is wielded by
the shaping and withholding or denying of information. The considera-
tion of complex organization and, particularly, the nature of organiza-
tional power is something that seems to me particularly salient to so-
cial workers.
Few of us would deny the ubiquity of power, yet we find it easy to
ignore. Social workers, often in an in-between position, need this
awareness, however painful, as part of their jobs. They must be acutely
conscious of the power they hold-however benevolently-over their cli-
ents, the power their agencies have over them, and the power the larger
political system has over their agencies. More important, they need to
go beyond this recognition, which can lead to resignation, and learn to
find the ways whereby they, their clients, and fellow citizens can re-
claim some share autonomy and resist the oppression of bureaucracy, greed,
and misgovernment. (for one sensitive to this see Polsky in Hearn, 1969)
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see Polsky in Hearn, 1969)
The consideration of information and its socially defined meaning
leads us back into the basic study of what the structure of society is
all about. (Buckley, 1967, 92f) Social workers may have little time
for tnese questions once they are in the field. But periodic recon-
sideration of basic questions in light of practice experience is indis-
pensible if our knowledge of social problems is to improve.
The consideration of information as the clue to complex organiza-
tion may produce some much more immediate insights. As a small example,
it suggests that normally powerless people may exert some influence
in the hierarchy. Secretaries and janitors, the most lowly people on
most corporate totem poles, may not have much initiative power, but
they can exert a certain amount of veto power. They know things about
the organization that the vice-presidents don't; and, if they want to,
they can obstruct implementation of policies and generally make life
miserable for many more highly placed individuals. I'm reminded of
the professor who, after a few weeks of misdirected mail, erroneous
classroom assignments, lost travel vouchers and supply orders, and de-
layed paychecks, decided that he was sorry he'd insulted the depart-
mental secretary. Most Senators are busy enough that they have little
time to research the bills their Committees are working on. Therefore,
they are extremely dependent on the information supplied by their staff
members for day-to-day votes. This can be a tremendous amount of power
for an un-elected and frequently very young person. This is not to
say that the power of underlings is at all comparable to that of the
top executives, but it is not negligible either. Most important, trac-
ing information through the organizational hierarchy can be the start
of a greater understanding of organization itself.
Seeing information as power itself may expand our appreciation of
social problems on the societal level, too. The fact tnat major oil
companies are the only source of information on energy reserves makes
it impossible for anyone to refute claims of shortages. Yet we must
be careful not to think that this is the only kind of power in society.
After all, if the organizational superordinate doesn't like the infor-
mation the subordinate is providing, he (or she?) can always fire the
whole staff. There are ways to get at oil companies, too.
CONCLUSION
If systems tneory is so broad that it allows both conservative
and radical interpretation of the same situation, is it any good at all
as a guide to practice? Is it anything mae than a stylish veneer for
a perspective derived elsewhere? Or is it a hip Sears catalogue that
we can buy from, higgledy-piggledy,as our whims and budget allows?
It is undeniable that systems theory throws a wide net; it was
intended as s ch. Moreover, its intellectual heritage is diverse
enough to nave made the many interpretations contained within its hos-
pitable boundaries inevitable. Still, I think that there is a coherent
and consistent systems theory that can be of some definite help to
social workers.
The reason I spent time on the historical origins of systems
thinking was to get a clearer idea of which themes seem most likely to
gain empirical support and where concepts are likely to lead in prac-
tice. Not all the concepts currently associated with systems theory
are essential to a systems perspective. The systems garden is lush
enough to permit considerable weeding and pruning without killing much
that is vital. Mindless bouquet-gathering is neither necessary nor
advisable.
The systems framework is purposely of the highest abstraction.
The idea that possessed its founders was to find structural and organi-
zational unity in all the sciences. The difficulties systems theory
has experienced owe much to the fact that its proponents simply assumed
similarities to be there rather than examining possible similarities
closely in practice. Some biological concepts may be appropriate to
society and some may not be. The mathematical definitions of engineer-
ing may fit some biological or social phenomena and not others. Anal-
ogies from social organization may or may not describe things in other
realms. Unification of the sciences wasn't expected overnight.
To the practitioner with problems a little more immediate than
scientific unification, there still may be use in a carefully construc-
ted, and probably stripped-down, systems perspective. The example set
by Walter Buckley a decade ago still merits following. Even without
further modification, it has much to offer social workers. With a
reasonable model of this sort one can then begin to examine the lesser
known territories of daily human suffering with some kind of map. A
map without a lot of details on it is annoying but better than no map
at all. It is also a useful supplement to one's memory of where one
was last week.
In the process one must I) always be aware of the potential
biases of the map or model from examination of its logic and the his-
tory of its past use, and 2) test rather than assume the existence of
each reference. Then systems theory may indeed inspire some new in-
sights within an organized framework that will extend their benefit to
greater and wider successful application.
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